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Naming Beyond Pointing:
Singularity, Relatedness and the
Foreshadowing of Death
Veena Das
1 While proper names are seen as a test case for theories of reference in much of analytical
philosophy, anthropologists have been much more interested in showing if a theory of
names might be generated from the actual practices around names and naming practices
in different societies.1 In a discussion on proper names that has achieved canonical status
in anthropology, Lévi-Strauss singled out two important aspects of naming—first, that
one’s relation to one’s name lies between the two poles of immutability and stability on
the  one  side and  changeability  and  volatility,  on  the  other;  second,  that  there  is  a
foreshadowing  of  death  in  the  investment  of  a  ghostly  being  in  a  name  (Lévi-
Strauss 1966).  To  these  two  aspects  one  might  add  a  third,  which  grows  from Lévi-
Strauss’s contention that proper names always remain at the margins of classification.
Once a name is seen as a proper name, he says, it is assigned to a level beyond which it
ceases to be a matter of classification, which implies that while sometimes names can be
proper names that indicate identity such as caste names, or family names that are stable,
at other times, they might be condensations of events such as who one is or has become
because of events as blessed as the birth of a child or as devastating as the death of a
relationship. This possibility of the name as encapsulating events draws attention to the
fact that over the life course a name signifies not only continuity of who one is in terms of
a  personal  identity,  but  also unpredictability  in one’s  relation to others.  New names
might  be  added to  existing  ones  as  a  complement  to  the  singularity  of  being  or  in
opposition to it. Said otherwise, names, like persons, course through lives so names, like
bodies, often carry the traces of the changes that have occurred in the life of a person.
2 Lévi-Strauss based much of his discussion on names on the ethnography of  Penan,  a
group of forest nomads living in the interior of north-western Borneo studied by Rodney
Needham (1954) who noted that ‘In the general extreme simplicity of Penan culture the
types of names and the usages connected with them stand out in surprising complexity’
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(Needham 1954: 416). Penan names are distinguished between personal names, tekonyms
(e.g., father of so and so) and necronyms in which a kinship relation to a deceased relative
comes to replace the proper name. Needham’s account showed that individuals must
necessarily move between different names over a lifetime. A child might start with a
proper name till one of his ascendants dies at which time he sheds the proper name and
takes on the necronym (e.g. father dead). If a sibling dies the child takes the name—sibling
dead—since the necronym is not a proper name but the indication of the relationship to a
deceased relative. When a child bearing a necronym of a sibling is blessed with a new
sibling, she reverts back to her initial proper name. As a child grows into adulthood he or
she might move to a tekonym—so-and-so’s father,  so-and-so’s mother.  Thus a person
might pass through six or seven names before he or she marries and has children.
3 Does  this  discussion  of  Penan  names  provide  a  more  general  framework  for
understanding what is at stake for anthropologists in understanding the volatility and
changeability of names? While Lévi-Strauss was interested in the structural implications
of these naming practices, their movements of ascent and descent, I  am intrigued by
another aspect—that of proclaiming or withholding a particular name from among the
multiplicity of personal names that are usually given to an individual in India. I argue
that  attention  to  these  aspects  of  naming  offers  a  key  to  understanding  the  lethal
potential that inheres in all intimate relations. The double character of names—that they
can be signs of intimacy that restricts their circulation and also signs of the aspiration to
be projected outward into publicity—seems to require not one definitive description but a
series of  descriptions through which the significance of  names and naming practices
might be disclosed.  As I  will  argue,  names appear sometimes to be located in secure
conventions but at other times they are thrown into the whirl of events as the subject
faces the risk of losing hold over the security of his or her name.
4 In order to build my argument I  take two kinds of insights—first from literary texts,
especially the Rāmāyaṇa (and its vernacular versions) and the Mahābhārata—and second
from my long tern ethnographic engagement with low-income residents of Delhi (see
Das 2015). That anthropologists should find an intimacy with literature in their thinking
is  not  a  surprise.  Marc  Augé  (2011)  speaks  of  the  silent  conversation  between
anthropologists and works of fiction. Other anthropologists, especially Michael Jackson
(2013) and Vincent Crapanzano (2003), have established the affinity between literature
and anthropology as integral to the anthropological way of knowing. In my own work on
catastrophic violence I felt that we turn to the poets to give us words when we ourselves
stumble in the face of violence and suffering (Das 2007).  In much of this writing, the
conversation between literature and anthropology is seen as taking place in the space
between fieldwork and writing, helping in the modes of interpretation, providing words
when  our  own  vocabularies  fail  or  regarding  the  literary  as  providing  a  model  for
constructing  the  anthropological  text.  In  this  paper,  though,  I  am interested in  two
different levels at which this conversation becomes possible—one, when we find literary
and philosophical expressions in the speech of our respondents in the field and second, as
we look at writers as fellow travelers whose aesthetic rendering of what is happening
provides insights on how to become awakened to the world that we as anthropologists
might try to disclose in our own writing. In the case of the epics in India, which are part
of living traditions, my respondents often evoked such stories as a way to speak about
events and about their relationships. Irawati Karve (2008) argued for a similar sensitivity
in  her  pioneering  analysis  of  the  characters  in  the  Mahābhārata.  Elsewhere  I  have
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developed a more sustained argument on the modalities through which we might think of
literature as enabling us to focus or to hold still certain moments that would otherwise
pass us by; one might compare this with still life paintings or a close up as a cinematic
moment in which the dispersed emotions might be gathered and condensed (Das 2015). I
hope that the methodological risks that I take by juxtaposing significant moments in a
text with insights from ethnographic vignettes will help me reveal how concepts that we
use in anthropology might well be seen as growing from everyday life rather than being
‘applied’  to everyday life and that literature might help us to theorize in a different
modality than that of say, axiomatic reasoning.
 
How can I bear my name? The lament of Bharata
5 The temporal unfolding of different contexts through which one’s life moves bring to the
fore new ways of experiencing one’s own name. Think in the literary register of the well-
known lament of Romeo—‘My name, dear saint,  is hateful to myself,  Because it is an
enemy to thee.’ In this section I take up the question: when is it that a name that was
proudly borne, becomes difficult to bear either because one begins to see oneself through
the eyes of another who brings to the surface of consciousness an aspect of the self that
was previously seen as unremarkable (in the case of Romeo, the long history of clan
enmity); or because what has been proclaimed on behalf of one’s name is experienced as
out of harmony with one’s own sense of the self. This existential relation to the name—
that it is both mine and yet not under my control, for I might become obliged to bear the
consequences of another’s actions taken on my behalf, brings out the vulnerability to the
other that my name exposes me to. I argue that the events I will describe here show how
my own name can make me vulnerable to the world not seen as an objective overarching
reality out there but as ‘my world,’ made through modes of appropriation and unfolding
of  events  in  which  I  might  become  implicated.  My  first  example  of  this  kind  of
vulnerability and how it changes one’s experience of one’s name is taken from the well-
known episode in the Ayodhyā Kāṇḍa in which the hero of the epic, Rāma, has been exiled
to the forest through what the epic sees as the machinations of Kaikeyī, the youngest wife
of his father, who wants the kingdom for her own son, Bharata.
6 In order to place this episode in the larger narrative context let me briefly recapitulate
the main story of the Rāmāyaṇa, the original text in Sanskrit on which later versions in
India and South East Asia are based. There is a vast literature on the many versions of the
Rāmāyaṇa story  in  Sanskrit  and  in  vernacular  languages  as  well  as  the  textual  and
performance  traditions  based  on  this  story  in  different  regions  in  India  (see
Lutgendorf 1991;  Richman 1991).  The  simplest  rendering  of  the  main  story  goes  as
follows:
7 After a long period of childlessness, the king of Ayodhyā, Daśratha, performed a royal
fire-sacrifice  for  the  realization  of  his  wish  for  the  birth  of  a  son.  Through  divine
intervention, he was given a fruit that was shared between his three wives who then gave
birth to four sons, Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa, Bharata and Shatrughṇa. As part of their initiation
into adulthood, Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa were sent to the forest to get rid of the demons that
were troubling the renouncers and disrupting their sacrificial fires. In the course of their
sojourns, Rāma won the hand of the beautiful princess Sītā, daughter of the learned King
Janaka of Videha. Rāma was, however, again exiled to the forest for 14 years through the
plotting of the youngest queen, Kaikeyī as we saw, who wanted the kingdom for her son,
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Bharata. His brother, Lakṣmaṇa and his wife, Sītā, accompanied Rāma in his exile to the
forest.  King  Daśratha  died  of  grief  at  this  unbearable  turn  of  events.  Bharata  was
inconsolable  when  he  learnt  what  his  mother  had  done,  and  that  too  under  the
presumption that he would acquiesce in her plan. Refusing to accept the status of king, he
ruled Ayodhyā for fourteen years as the ‘servant’ of Rāma rather than its ruler. Another
grievous event happened during the second exile.  Rāvaṇa,  the demon king of  Lankā,
abducted Sītā.  Following this event, Rāma gathered an army of monkeys and bears to
search for her. The allies attacked Lankā,  killed Rāvaṇa, and rescued Sitā.  In order to
prove her chastity, Sītā had to undergo a fire ordeal, but was vindicated by the gods and
restored  to  her  husband.  After  the  couple’s  triumphant  return  to  Ayodhyā,  Rāma’s
righteous rule (Rāma-rājya) was inaugurated but soon after (depending on the version of
the text one is reading), Sītā was exiled again because of rumors about her chastity. Given
refuge in the āśrama of the sage Vālmiki, the author of the original Rāmāyaṇa, she gave
birth to two sons. Though Rāma was ready to take her back after her second ordeal by
fire, she refused to return to Ayodhyā, choosing to be swallowed by her mother, the earth
from which she had been born, rather than accepting the ignominy of living with rumors
about her chastity. In the Rāmacaritamānasa, the vernacular rendering of this story that
we shall be considering, the episode of the second exile is expunged on the ground that it
was a shadow Sītā  who was abducted by Rāvaṇa—an interesting narrative device for
making a shift in the story more consonant with the feeling that Sītā’s chastity was never
in doubt.2
8 I have analyzed the narrative structure of the text, including the various coda elsewhere
(see  Das 1982).  Here  I  will  focus  on  some  iconic  moments  in  the  text  that  portray
Bharata’s lament on hearing of his mother’s ignoble actions and the verbal devices used
(especially that of swearing), by which he is exonerated from any hint of complicity with
Kaikeyī through the words of Rāma and his mother Kauśalyā. As we shall see, a swirl of
imaginaries around names emerges in these verses, providing a rich provocation to think
of the relation between name and vulnerability.
9 Let  us,  then,  go  in  our  imagination  to  the  palace  in  Ayodhyā  where  Bharata  and
Shatrughṇa the two younger princes have been summoned to return from their sojourn
in Bharata’s maternal uncle’s kingdom. They know nothing yet of the misfortunes that
have befallen Ayodhyā—the exile of Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and Sītā to the forest through the
devious acts (as the text sees it)  of  Kaikeyī  and the death of their father,  Daśaratha.
Kaikeyī had assumed that Bharata would be pleased at the ascension to the position of
king for in her own eyes she had acted for his benefit—yet to her dismay Bharata fell into
a rage on hearing what she had done, accusing her of the worst possible sin committed
not only against Daśaratha and Rāma but against Bharata himself.
10 Here is how Kaikeyī announces what she has been able to do in Bharata’s absence when
he makes the usual polite inquiries about everyone’s well-being:
tāt bāat main sakal samvārī bhai mantharā sahāy bechārī
kachuk  kāja  vidhi  bīca  bigāḍeu  bhūpati  surpati  pur  pagu  dhāreu ( Ayodhyā  Kāṇda,
Verse 149/1)
11 Tāt (lit. grandfather or little father, an affectionate way of addressing a child), I have
taken care of all with the help of Mantharā—though fate spoiled some things—the lord of
the earth (i.e. the king) left for the abode of gods.
12 Kaikeyī reveals the full extent of the story in which she had been counselled by Mantharā
(her maid) to ask the king to honor an earlier vow that he would fulfill any two wishes she
Naming Beyond Pointing: Singularity, Relatedness and the Foreshadowing of Death
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 12 | 2015
4
asked for. After Kaikeyī had ensured that Daśratha took an oath on the name of Rāma that
he would not renege on his promise, she demanded that Rāma be exiled to the forest for
fourteen years and Bharata be crowned as king. Bharata is stunned at this treachery that
has led to the exile of his elder brother and the infamy that awaits him now of conspiring
against his own brother for the love of a kingdom. He lashes out at Kaikeyī, calling her a
sinful woman and asking that if she had such hatred toward him, why had she not killed
him at the moment of his birth so that he would not have had to carry the ignominy of
coming to be known as Rāma’s enemy.
13 Among the many passages on Bharata’s lament, let us take the following two:
Hansbansu Daśaratha janaku Rāma Lakhan se Bhāi
Jananī tu jananī bhai vidhi san kahu nā basāi (Ayodhyā Kāṇda, Verse 161)
I was born in the lineage of the sun, Daśaratha is my father, 
brothers as (great as) Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa,
Yet, you (lowly) woman, became my mother—who can argue with fate?
And now take the following verse.
Kaikeyī sujhan jogaj jag joi, catur viraci dīna mohi sokandī
Daśaratha tanay Rāma laghu bhaī,
dīna mohī vidhi baḍi baḍai (Ayodhyā Kānḍa, Verse 180/1)
14 Freely translated it reads as follows:
That Kaikeyī who has become defamed in the world
And clever fate has assigned me to that very person
I am the son of Daśaratha
and the younger brother of Rāma
But fate has done me such a great favor (by making Kaikeyī my mother).
15 There are other powerful verses in which Bharata laments as to why Kaikeyī was born in
the world, if she had to be born, why was she not infertile (bānjh) and if she were to have
a son, why was that son Bharata?
16 In an earlier paper on these episodes (Das 1982), I argued that the violent rejection of the
mother here is part of the story of fathers and sons—the mother is the conduit through
which sons come to be attached to their father’s lineages, but once a son’s place is fully
secured in  the  patrilineage,  the  mother  is  expected to  efface  herself.  Bharata’s  rage
against his mother is not only on grounds of abstract moral principles (for she had held
Daśaratha to a moral contract they had made and hence had, strictly speaking, committed
no offence),  but  rather because she had broken the unspoken understanding of  how
mothers must efface themselves from the unbroken connections between fathers and
sons. Bharata’s rage, however, is not related only to the public blemish but also to the
sense of disgust he feels at having been born of Kaikeyī, and of being expelled from the
fraternity of brothers. I find the play between the proper name Bharata and the tekonyms
—son of Daśaratha, younger brother of Rāma—quite fascinating. While the patronymics
are embraced as badges of honor—the name Kaikeyī putra—the son of Kaikeyī becomes a
source of shame. Bharata shrinks from this appellation as from something that bites him
from within. This is particularly remarkable in the text since in the previous chapter,
when Bharata was bidding farewell to his maternal uncle, King Kaikeya, he had embraced
the blessings and the tekonym—son of Kaikeyī—the very connection he was to reject
violently in the next section. The names thus become condensations of swirling affects of
regret, lament, blame, desire and aspiration. The issue is not that of reference—how does
a proper name refer, to isolate who the bearer is—but rather of reaching into the open
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texture of the name through which a range of affects can be condensed and presented all
at once without need of further description.
17 A second aspect of the name that the text reveals is that one’s name might also make one
vulnerable to another not through hate but through love. The verse I want to take here is
that in which Kauśalyā, Rāma’s mother, who comes forward herself to exonerate Bharata
from any suspicion of complicity with what has transpired. Bharata had gone to the forest
to beg Rāma to return and take up the reigns of the kingdom and to offer to take Rāma’s
place  in  exile.  There  follows  an  initial  misunderstanding  primarily  on  the  part  of
Lakṣmaṇa and some others who thought that Bharata was coming to wage war against a
defenseless Rāma. Their fears were assuaged by Rāma who swore on the name of his
revered, lamented father and on the name of Lakṣmaṇa that he could vouch that Bharata
was incapable of bearing any enmity to him. The same suspicion arose once again—this
time in the mind of  Janaka,  the king of  Mithilā  and the father  of  Sītā  and his  wife
Sunayanā—and was  again calmed by Kauśalyā’s  swearing on the  name of  Rāma that
Bharata had not been part of the conspiracy to exile Rāma. Instead, she attributed this
terrible turn of  events to the machinations of  fate.  Kauśalyā’s  words are particularly
interesting here for she says, ‘Rāma śapath main kīnhī nā kāu, so kari kahūn sakhī sati bhau’ (
Ayodhyā Kānḍa, Verse 282/1)—I have never sworn by Rāma but now doing that, oh friend, I
speak with truthfulness (of Bharata’s devotion to Rāma).
18 Why does  this  cultural  notion—that  someone  who stands  in  an  intimate  relation  to
another, might use the name of this intimate other to establish the truth, and elicit the
faith of the listener, by taking an oath on his or her name—make one vulnerable to the
other and even to the world? First of all, I suggest that what such an act of swearing does
is to make the loved other into a ransom to be redeemed by the truthfulness of the
utterance—for the one whose name serves as the means for asserting the truth, it is as if
in being so implicated through the act of swearing, one has been forced to recognize that
one is always vulnerable to the words and gestures of another. Kauśalyā proclaims that
she has never sworn by the name of  Rāma—she makes an exception for the sake of
Bharata just as Rāma had calmed Lakṣmaṇa earlier by swearing on his name. But can she
be certain that Bharata will not betray her?
19 What is the risk one takes in swearing on the name of a loved one? I suggest that the risk
is that of putting a beloved person in danger. For if my words turn out not to be true,
some  harm  would  result  to  him  or  her—one  has  gambled  on  how  much  trust  or
confidence one might  place in one’s  ability  to read the other,  or  even oneself.  Take
Kauśalyā’s utterance—she says she never swears on the name of Rāma—in other words,
however confident she might be of her own intentions, she would never put Rāma at any
risk of misfortune. But now in proclaiming that Bharata could never have been swayed by
any love for the kingdom to betray Rāma, she has betted on Rāma, trusting that what she
knows of Bharata is true. But suppose Bharata turned out to be like other brothers who
deceive each other, then not only would she be betrayed but she might also have betrayed
Rāma by swearing on his name. Ideally the text seems to suggest that one should never
take someone one loves as the instrument for winning the faith of others. In a world in
which we could be certain of our loves, and of our faith in the others with whom we live,
we would never put another at risk through our actions—but the text seems to suggest
that swearing by another is a mode of speech through which our words may, irrespective
of our intentions, jeopardize the good fortune or even the lives of those we love.
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20 One piece of evidence the text gives of this danger of treating the other as a ransom is
found in the exchange between Kaikeyī and Daśaratha when she asks that the two boons
the king had promised now be redeemed. Mantharā had advised the queen that in order
to bind the king completely to his words she must get him to swear by Rāma so that he
would be bound to grant her whatever she asked for. In their exchange the king says that
he loves Kaikeyī so much that he is not unwilling to swear by Rāma and yet when he hears
that she wants Rāma to be exiled, he realizes that he has ransomed his son to the wrong
person. This imagination of the character of intimacy and uncertainty draws on the name
as that aspect of the self that is in the hands of those we love and in whose hands we may
find redemption or destruction. Of course when I promise to do something, swearing by
my most beloved intimate other, I create trust in my words. This is why swearing must
always be in the name of someone one loves—it would make no sense to swear by the
name of a stranger—but it also points to our ability to put those we love at risk by our
own actions thus revealing the dark potential of names.
21 The closeness of Tulsidas’s language to everyday life among the families I have followed
in my work comes out in stark relief in my fieldwork notes. In the exchange between
Kaikeyī and Bharata, the commentary of the poet draws on many homely analogies—for
instance, that her words were like salt rubbed on a burn wound (jale par namak lagānā) or
referring to the anger that Shatrughṇa felt at the sight of Mantharā using the analogy of
fire having received an āhuti—the offering that causes it to burn more vigorously. These
modes of speaking are, indeed, prevalent in the everyday speech of the communities I
have studied. Equally prevalent is the practice of swearing or taking an oath on the name
of an intimate other. I want to contrast this practice with that of taking an oath on the
name of a sacred text—in which what is put at risk is not the life of one’s beloved other
but one’s own reputation for truthfulness.
 
Swearing and the Name of the Sacred
22 Geoffrey Hughes (1991),  the historian of coarse language,  has established that a shift
occurred in modes of swearing from the 16th century to today, so that the formal and
respectful forms of swearing in the English-speaking world have given way to swearing
that is close to cursing. Respectful forms of oath-taking, he says, are now seen primarily
within formal institutions such as courts of law or at the inauguration to political office.
Hughes offers some broad distinctions among modes of swearing. In his words, ‘We swear
by, we swear that (something is so), we swear to (do something), we swear at (somebody or
something), and sometimes we swear simply out of exasperation.’ (Hughes 1991: 4) He
then goes on to declare that the crude history of swearing, however named, is that people
used to swear by or to, but now they swear mostly at.
23 The Indian languages I work with (Hindi, Urdu, Bangla, Gujarati, Punjabi) still have to find
their  historian  of  the  underworld  of  language;  in  my  ethnography  of  the  everyday,
though,  the spheres within which one would swear by or swear that were somewhat
different from those in which the primary mode of swearing was that of swearing at. The
latter forms of swearing slid into obscene talk and will not concern me here.
24 Similar  to  the  scenes  we  see  in  the  Rāmacaritamānasa,  people  used  the  devices  of
‘swearing by’  on momentous occasions as well  as  in the everyday run of  things.  For
instance,  gift  giving  on  routine  visits  among  relatives  often  involved  an  elaborate
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performance of offers and refusals. A common scene was that of a younger married sister
bringing an expensive gift for her brother’s children when visiting his household. Since
sisters are seen as appropriate recipients of gifts but not as individuals from whom one can
accept gifts, there was an inevitable performance of the sister thrusting the gift toward
her nephew or niece,  her  brother or  sister-in-law engaging in a  veritable  theatre of
gestures of refusal; the sister then saying at some stage—tvānu meri kasam je nā kīti—lit. I
bind you with my oath if you say no (to my gift). The implication is that I have put myself
on the stake for this  and if  you refuse the gift  then you have belittled my life.  The
exchange might end with either a reluctant acceptance, with words such as ‘one gives to
sisters, one does not receive from them’ or a return gift even larger than what was given.
Elsewhere,  I  have  examined  what  I  called  the  aesthetics  of  kinship  in  gift-giving
(Das 2012).3 Here I want to simply point out that verbal forms such as swearing on oneself
are much more common when it is a person who is subordinate who is urging an action
on the part of a superior. If the person is older or more powerful in kinship hierarchy,
then  it  would  be  much  more  common to  swear  on  the  name  of  a  younger  person.
Reversals of this principle are dramatic occasions, as was the case when Rāma swore not
only on the name of Lakṣmaṇa but also on the name of his lamented father.
25 Sometimes in serous family disputes or when innocence has to be established, as was the
case with Bharata, one might be asked to take an oath on the name of a sacred text. One
such case I witnessed was in a Muslim household in which an aunt of a young girl had
made an accusation that she had seen the girl with a boy in the market place. Given the
strictness  of  norms  of  purity  and  honor  that  center  around  the  surveillance  of  the
behavior of young women, her parents were extremely angry with her and dragged the
aunt to a family assembly in which the family Quran was produced and the girl was asked
to swear by the Quran that she had not been out with a boy. The girl was crying but,
putting her hand on the Quran, she said ‘I swear by the Quran that I never went out with
anybody.’ Even the aunt, gossip monger though she was, could not bring herself to say
that the girl was lying and went away muttering that she might have been mistaken.
‘Nobody would dare to swear falsely on the Quran’—this was a common refrain heard
after the event, but some older people also said that it was wrong of the parents to have
settled the matter with the help of the Quran. One old woman definitely told me that she
would not have ever sworn by the Quran even if she were innocent. Recall here Kauśalyā’s
words that  she never swears by the name of  Rāma but was making an exception to
salvage Bharata’s name.
26 One day in a heated discussion on whether Aurangzeb was a good ‘Indian’ among a group
of friends that included Zargham Mian (a Muslim) and Ranjit Singh (a Sikh), in one of the
low-income areas in my field site, the topics ranged from the imposition of the jazia tax4
on Hindus to whether Aurangzeb was the first king to have envisaged India as a nation.
But then Rantjit Singh produced his own argument with the help of the letter of victory
written by Guru Gobind Singh, the tenth guru of the Sikhs, to Aurangzeb after the battle
of Chamkaur in 1704, in which he had accused Aurangzeb of being a bad Muslim for
having broken an oath he had taken on the Quran.
27 I believe that Ranjit Singh was referring to the verses in which the guru says that, having
promised him safe passage out of Anandgarh fort by swearing on the Quran and then
attacking his forces, Aurangzeb had shown himself to have betrayed his religion.5
mārā aitbār bar n kasm-e-nīst
ke eizad gavah ast yazdan yakīst (Verse 12)
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na katreh mārā aitbār-e bar-ost
ki bakshi va dwan hameh kizb gost (Verse 13)
28 Freely translated, these verses say: I have no trust in your oaths for (you had written on a
Quran) that God is one and he is our witness (and yet you broke your oath). I do not have
a drop of faith in your generals who gave immunity (swearing on the Quran)—but they
were telling lies.
29 The indictment of Aurangzeb as a Muslim is contained in one of the concluding verses:
na dānam ki n mard paimān shikan
ke daulat prast ast maan fikan
30 I did not know that you are a perjurer—a mere worshipper of wealth and one who has
falsified his faith.
31 Although I cannot take this thought further here, the examples from ethnography and
texts I have assembled point to important directions in which we take our understanding
of names. First, that a person’s name can make him or her a hostage to precisely those
who hold that name precious, since my name can be taken by another in such moments
as  that  of  swearing  by  me  to  either  attest  to  the  truth  of  their  own  words,  or  in
proclaiming faith in a third person that might turn out to be justified or not. But that is
not the end of the story, for I can also offer myself as a hostage by swearing on myself to
coerce someone who cares for me to act according to my wishes rather than what he or
she wants. Above all there is the standing possibility of swearing by a sacred name, which,
if done with insincerity, cannot harm the sacred entity but can make me forever doomed
in the eyes of  some imagined eternity or  at  least  in the eyes of  history.  This  is  the
profound meaning that Ranjit Singh (my Sikh interlocutor) was so able to draw from in an
argument which was otherwise in the register of simply everyday talk.
32 A final thought I want to place here is that one aspect of swearing by someone comes out
in sharper  relief  when we consider  the rules  of  Sanskrit  grammar pertaining to  the
grammatical case. As Keiden (2011) makes clear, the rules on the kārakas, or cases, are
premised on a distinction between the semantic content or semantic role of a verbal
argument (kāraka) and the morphological form (vibhakti the particle that is attached to
the word as case ending). It is then interesting to see that the person on whose name one
swears is put in the karana kāraka or the instrumental case. There is an example in the
Kiṣkindhā  Kānḍa from Vālmīki’s  Rāmāyaṇa,  in which Rāma comes across the deposed
monkey  King  Sugrīva  and  promises  to  restore  his  kingdom and  his  wife  to  him by
defeating his brother Valī.
tvaṃ hi pāṇipradānena vayasyo me ‘gnisākṣikaḥ
kṛtaḥ prāṇair bahumataḥ satyenāpi śapāmy aham (Kiṣkindhā Kānḍa, Verse 8.26)
33 For us the interesting part is the phrase ‘satyenāpi śapāmy aham’—I swear by truth—for we
see that the medium through which one swears is put in the instrumental  case.  The
general rule governing the instrumental case is that what stands in a sentence for the
most effective means through which an action is to be accomplished takes the form of the
instrumental case and stands in a relation of subordination to the kartā, the grammatical
agent of an action, who is defined as svatantra, or unconstrained. I believe that in the
grammatical rule that prescribes the instrumental case in relation to the verb shap (oath
taking, swearing) we have not only a grammatical rule but a whole philosophy of the
person that our discussion of names has opened a door to.
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Taking multiple names
34 That the names of gods function as adjectives,  condensed descriptions of qualities or
events,  is  a  well-known  feature  of  Hinduism and  carries  important  implications  for
devotional practices (Das 2008). Thus Pārvatī and Umā both refer to the goddess being a
daughter  of  the  mountains.  One  of  her  names,  Aparṇā,  signifies  that  she  performed
severe austerities,  refusing to eat  even leaves for nourishment (a—parṇā deprived of
leaves) when she performed penance to win Śiva’s love; her name Umā can also mean ‘do
not’  alluding  to  Menakā (her  mother)  asking  her  daughter  to  give  up  the  severe
austerities she performed in order to get Śiva as her husband. As Satī she is the previous
incarnation and the daughter of Dakṣa; as Śivānī she is the one with the Śiva element in
her. Devotees will use her one hundred and eight names for meditation while Himalaya is
said to have invoked her 1008 names in his prayers, each name referring to a different
aspect of her being.
35 I  am tempted  to  use  here  Wittgenstein’s  (1968)  idea  of  aspect  dawning  when  he  is
discussing the duck-rabbit picture, for it is not as if the duck is the true picture or the
rabbit is the true picture but that both are simultaneously present—yet we now see it as a
duck and now as a rabbit. It is not that we mechanically oscillate between the two aspects
but seeing now the duck and now the rabbit are both potentials contained in the picture.
Applying this important insight from Wittgenstein to the case of the multiple names of
gods  and  goddesses,  I  suggest  that  each  name  condenses  the  different  possibilities
inherent in any narrative rendering, regardless of which one is realized at any one time.
There are, however, limits to this analogy since aspect dawning is strongly tied to vision—
what it is to see something as something—now a rabbit, now a duck. In the case of the
multiplicity of names that might come to stick to a person, we might have a different set
of questions occasioned by the fact that names are primarily words not pictures (though a
picture might be conjured by a name). We may ask: does naming work by fixation or by
movement and metamorphosis? In the concluding comment I will return to this question
from a comparative perspective. For now let us take the example of Draupadī from the
Mahābhārata to illustrate how her different names come to condense the different layers
of the narrative signaling the important idea that a narrative might reveal itself to be
simultaneously enacted on different planes, in different spaces and in different times.
36 Recall that Draupadī is the princess who was staked in a game of dice by Yudhiṣthira, the
eldest brother of the five Pāṇḍavas—the protagonists of the epic who were denied their
rightful share in the kingdom by their half-brothers, the Kauravas. This injustice led to a
war between the two related patrilineages—but this war of total destruction also marked
the move of mankind into history—or the period of kaliyuga. The difference between the
two epics—the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata—we are considering here is described by
Sheldon Pollock in these terms:
The works are,  in a  fundamental  way,  complementary.  […] Both poems relate a
struggle over succession to the throne, leading to a degradation of the princess and
the  political  power  she  represents  and  (before  or  after  that)  the  exile  of  the
protagonists,  war,  return,  and  recovery  of  the  throne.  But  here  too  the
complementarities are telling. Most important is the agon itself; the Rāmāyaṇa is a
tale of ‘othering,’ the enemy is non-human, even demonic, and the war takes place
in  an  unfamiliar,  far-away  world;  the  Mahābhārata is  a  tale  of  ‘brothering’;  the
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enemy are kinsmen—indeed, as the protagonists say, almost their own selves—and
the war takes place at home. (Pollock 2007: 34)
37 In this context it is interesting to consider the various names of Draupadī—i.e. Pānchalī,
Yagyasenī, and Krishnā—that occur in different places in the text.6 Draupadī the name
used most frequently for her simply means, the daughter of Drupad—just as Jānakī in the
Rāmāyaṇa is simply daughter of Janak. In the course of the story of the humiliation of
Draupadī in the court of Kurus, the subsequent war and the avenging of her insult, we
also learn that within the mythic logic of the text, Draupadī (whose other names Pānchalī
and Yagyasenī point to her dark origin) is but the instrument of the will of gods born to
ensure  the  complete  destruction  of  the  Kurus  and  the  Pānchālas,  the  two  powerful
Kṣatriya lineages, whose incessant warfare has made the earth tired. Her name, Pānchālī,
signifies her birth in the kingdom of the Pānchāla and along with Yagyasenī refers to
another story within this rich tapestry of stories. The essential elements of the story are
as follows. Droṇa, a Brahmin and Drupada, a Kṣatriya and the future Pānchāla king, are
childhood friends. However, a terrible enmity develops between them and Drupada is
humiliated in battle by Droṇa. Burning with the fire of vengeance, he performs a fire-
sacrifice with the help of two priests to ritually produce a son for him who will kill Drona
and avenge his defeat. A mighty son is born from the sacrificial fire, but unintended by
the sacrificers and initially unnoticed by anyone, a beautiful girl is also born from the
sacrificial altar. Hence her name Yajyasenī.
38 What is the meaning of this birth, a residue of the sacrifice—a clear acknowledgement
that the human king might have had one kind of purpose (wreaking vengeance on his
enemy) in performing the fire sacrifice, but the gods have used that very moment for
setting into motion a different kind of violence? The text tells us that as soon as she was
born, a disembodied, heavenly voice announced that Krishna (another name for Draupadī
referring to her dark associations and her affinity with Kali, the goddess of death and
time) will accomplish the work of gods and lead the Kṣtriyas to their destruction. Indeed,
the prediction comes true in the course of the great battle. Thus the names are pregnant
with the future possibilities of the narrative and are an important means for the side-
shadowing that Hiltebeitel (2001) sees as an essential element of storytelling in Hindu
texts.
39 As Saria’s essay on name changing among the hijras (in this volume) argues, there is a
subjunctive element in the hijra practices of name changing—a desire to cut themselves
off from a past or from relationships that have been corroded. In the case of multiple
names of characters in the epics, there are two implicit theoretical claims on what names
can mean. First that our fully-realized selves are embodied in the most well-known and
public  name  one  is  known  by  (e.g. Draupadī);  second,  that  name  hides  in  it  other
possibilities of who we could become. Unknown to herself, Draupadī is also an instrument
of the gods who leads the two lineages to their destruction just as in swearing by the
name of  another one ends up making him or  her  into an instrument  for  one’s  own
projects—a  feature  condensed  in  the  grammatical  rule  on  the  karaṇa  kāraka—the
instrumental  case—discussed earlier.  I  find it  poignant that  during their  exile  in the
forest when the Pāṇdavas were enjoined to remain completely anonymous for one year,
Draupadī  took  the  name of  Sairandharī—female  servant.  In  the  end was  she  but  an
instrument of the will of the gods, a servant to accomplish what the others, standing
outside the social, wanted of her?
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40 I want to conclude this section with a brief discussion of paragraph 79 in the Philosophical
Investigations,  when  Wittgenstein  (1968)  alludes  to  the  various  descriptions  that  can
attach to a name. It is worth citing this paragraph at some length:
Consider this example.  If  one says ‘Moses did not exist,’  this may mean various
things. It may mean: the Israelites did not have a single leader when they withdrew
from Egypt—or:  their  leader  was  not  called  Moses—or:  there  cannot  have  been
anyone who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses—or: etc. etc. We may
say,  following  Russell:  the  name  ‘Moses’  can  be  defined  by  means  of  various
descriptions.  For  example,  as  ‘the  man  who  led  the  Israelites  through  the
wilderness,’  ‘the  man  who  lived  at  that  time  and  place  and  was  then  called
“Moses”,’ ‘the man who as a child was taken out of the Nile by Pharaoh’s daughter’
and so on. And according as we assume one definition or another, the proposition
‘Moses did not exist’ acquires a different sense, and so does every other proposition
about Moses […]
But when I make a statement about Moses,—am I always ready to substitute some
one of these descriptions for ‘Moses’? […] Has the name ‘Moses’  got a fixed and
unequivocal use for me in all possible cases?—Is it not the case that I have, so to
speak, a whole series of props in readiness, and am ready to lean on one if another
should be taken from under me and vice versa?
41 Wittgenstein goes on to observe that a name does not have a fixed meaning, but that does
not distract from its usefulness any more than the usefulness of the term ‘table’ when it
comes to refer to an object next to my chair that has three legs instead of four, and
therefore sometimes wobbles.7 In other words, the suggestion here is that the relation
between the name and the entity it  refers  to might vary in the context  of  different
descriptions that we might be able to offer of that person. In Saul Kripke’s (1971, 1980)
well-known formulation on rigid designators, proper names are rigid designators because
names of the same objects remain true in all possible worlds. In one of his examples—say,
if Hitler had never been born, Hitler would still refer—and rigidly—to something that
would not exist in that possible world. But at this point it seems interesting to ask what
makes it intuitively correct for us to imagine that if someone says ‘If Hitler had never
been born, the world would have been a better place,’ we know that this entity that does
not exist in that counterfactual world is Hitler. However, if someone says ‘I don’t believe
that anyone called Moses existed because no one could have performed all those things
that Moses is said to have done,’ it is possible to imagine that Moses does not refer to any
particular entity in any rigid sense. What makes the difference between the fixity of one
and the relatively open texture of the latter is not anything derived from logic but from
our sensibilities regarding what is history, what we express when we say if only Hitler
had never been born, and our astonishment, if we do not have much use for miracles, that
anyone could imagine that a person by the name of Moses could have made the sea to
part. The open texture of a name may be brutally curtailed when one comes under the
eyes of the State, as in applying for a passport—in other contexts such as the names
lovers might give to each other, the question shifts to asking what different kinds of
histories  of  a  relationship  are  condensed  in  the  names  that  are  in  movement  or  in
transformation from one to another?
42 The multiplicity of names that I discussed in the case of Draupadī was anchored to the
multiple possibilities of a narrative and the fact that any one event always contained
shadows of other lives the same character might have lived (Hiltebeitel 2001). Who it is
who knows who you are might be recast in terms of questions about which names stick,
when do they become rigid, and who has the right to use what name for you? These
Naming Beyond Pointing: Singularity, Relatedness and the Foreshadowing of Death
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 12 | 2015
12
questions eventually lead one to the issue that the multiplicity of names, or multiple
descriptions of a name, raise—viz., whether one is the same person for different people
and whether there is essentially any one person that you are.
 
Name, foreshadowing of death, and ghostly lives
43 In  the introductory paragraphs of  this  paper  I  referred to  two important  aspects  of
naming that I took from Lévi-Strauss’s discussion of Penan names. The first was the poles
of stability and immutability on the one side and changeability and mutability on the
other within which names move. The second was the relation names bear to death. In the
Penan case the necronym refers to a kinship tie that has come to an end. As Lévi-Strauss
states the issue:
The necronym contains no proper names at all and consists in the statement of
kinship relation, which is that of an unnamed ‘other’s’ relation with a self equally
unnamed.  It  can  therefore  be  defined  as  an  ‘other’  relation.  And  finally,  this
relation is negative since the necronym mentions it only to declare it extinct. (Lévi-
Strauss 1966: 192)
44 Might we find shadows of the necronym—not necessarily in the form that naming takes
in the Penan case but in other ways in which the relation between a name or the manner
of our using it, might attune us to declarations of how death is encoded in the relation we
bear to names.
45 I met a woman in 2012 in a village on the fringes of Delhi, in the course of a focus-group
discussion on reproductive health and institutional births that I  was participating in.
Although she did not bring up her experiences in the focus group discussion, later, when
we were having tea, she told me as an aside that she did not have any children. Then in a
curious juxtaposition she said—‘main gharwale ko Munne ke bapu, Chotti ke bapu—aise keh ke
to bula nahin sakti na—name leti hun.’ Literally translated her statement says in effect that
since they have no children she cannot use the usual forms of address for her husband—
such as ‘Munna’s father’ or ‘Chotti’s father’ and hence used (lit. took) his name, Suresh. At
first I could not understand the import of the story—and why the whispered confidence
about being childless was immediately followed by the revelation of her ‘taking’ the name
of  her  husband.  I  know  the  taboo  in  India  that  prohibits  a  wife  from uttering  the
husband’s  name  and  the  fear  that  such  an  utterance  shortens  the  life of  the  man.
Responding to my somewhat bewildered look, she explained further. It seems she had lost
all her six babies either during birth or right after. In four cases she had miscarried in the
advanced stage of pregnancy and in two cases they died within a few hours of being born.
The bitterness in her voice was evident—‘My husband, could make me pregnant again and
again but he could not be bothered to take me to a proper doctor or to a proper hospital.
His drinking was more important to him then the lives of my children. Even now his
relatives taunt me—calling me banjh (a pejorative term for a woman who is infertile)—so I
too wish him a bit of death everyday by taking his name.’ By the phrase ‘taking his name,’
she  did  not  mean  that  she  called  him  by  his  name  (that  might  have  been  socially
unacceptable) but that if she had to send a message to him through another person when
he was in the street or drinking with his friends, she would say to a neighbor or to a boy
who was going in that direction—‘go, tell Suresh.’ In this way, she uttered his name many
times in the day and each time brought a little bit of death on him. Her revenge on the
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stigmatized name of banjh, with which her conjugal relatives slighted her existence as a
childless woman was to wish another stigma on herself—that of becoming a widow.
46 The second case that I offer for discussion is the opposite of the first one, in which a
woman could not bear to take the name of her abuser. I have discussed this case in an
earlier  paper  (Das 2014)  but  juxtaposing  this  case  with  the  previous  one  makes  the
dynamic relation between a name and the foreshadowing of death more complex. It also
helps to show how the idea of a necronym takes us to a very important region of everyday
life that might not be evident in the formal system of naming, but dawns on us in the way
people use names or withhold themselves from uttering particular names.  While one
might be accorded a place in the social scheme of things through the public name one
carries, whether one recognizes oneself in it is more than a simple matter of following
rules—behind the rules lie whole histories of  relationships that give everyday life its
particular texture.
47 Sheela’s family is among the small number of upper-caste families in Punjabi Basti, a low-
income neighborhood in West  Delhi.  Her  natal  family had escaped from the riots  in
Pakistan, but her father died soon after. So she grew up in her maternal uncle’s house
along with her mother, two sisters, and five older cousins. She was married at an early
age to a much older man, who in other circumstances would have been considered below
the status of her natal family. And although she never narrated in one long story the facts
of  her  sexual  abuse  as  a  child,  little  bits  of  her  story  would  come out  on  different
occasions when we were together, in such expressions as ‘Mere naal vi bure karam hoye’ 
(bad acts happened with me too).8 For instance, once when she was helping her eight-
year-old granddaughter to change into a new dress, she became tearful and, putting her
hand on her mouth as if to block speech from bursting out, said, ‘Oh god, this is how little
I  was  when…’  She  did  not  elaborate,  but  something  in  her  past  had  rotated  and
confronted  her  at  this  moment.9 As  a  child  Sheela  was  often  slapped,  sometimes
figuratively if not actually beaten with sticks [ḍanḍe paḍte the], not by her other relatives
but  by  her  mother.  This  aspect,  though,  she  recalled  with  a  kind  of  cheerfulness,
commenting  that  her  mother  had  to  beat  her  to  signal  her  own  status  toward  her
relatives,  who,  though  not  well  off,  had  taken  the  additional  burden  of  dependent
relatives. ‘What could she do—there was a compulsion [mazboori thi].’ Elsewhere I have
described this as the aesthetics of kinship (Das 2012).
48 Though she let some expressions of her hurt escape in my presence, I never asked and she
never said whether she had told the story of her abuse to anyone, including her husband.
As I have described elsewhere, in matters of sexual violation, there is an agreement in
families displaced by the Partition that one does not ask any explicit questions; instead
one allows  oneself  to  be  marked by  the  knowledge  that  comes  one’s  way.  Here  the
anthropologist’s mode of being converges into that of the others in the community. There
were two occasions, though, when Sheela did tell me something. The first occurred when
I  told her  that  there  was  a  discipline  called  psychoanalysis  in  which  therapeutic
interventions consisted of the ‘patient’ talking every week for an hour with the therapist,
saying whatever came to her mind. She said that she wished she could find a guru who
would understand her without her having to say anything. Then she went on to say that
she could imagine ‘talking’ about those things, but she could not imagine ever saying
aloud the name of the person who had violated her. ‘I cannot even say it aloud to myself.
It is like I am holding something in me, tight as a fist, a coiled snake, and if that came out,
the world would be thrown into chaos [duniya utthal putthal ho jayegi].’
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49 What  is  it  about  a  name that  holds  such powers  of  destruction?  How does  Sheela’s
inability to name her abuser relate to the first case of Suresh’s wife insisting on uttering
his name when she could? We know that uttering some names repeatedly such as the
name of a beloved god or goddess in devotional practice brings merit.  In other cases
married women say that the refusal to speak the name of one’s husband comes from the
desire to protect and honor him and its violation as we saw in the first case, is nothing
short of wishing death upon one’s husband. In Sheela’s case, however, her abuser did not
stand in any normative relation to her, yet she said she feels nauseous, physically ill and
in the throes of a panic if she were to pronounce her abuser’s name even silently to
herself.
50 There is another register of proper names that might have a resonance with the dread
that Sheela feels in uttering the name of her abuser. While it is meritorious to recite the
name of any god or goddess, as I said, it is only the ritual adepts, such as diviners, who
can safely get a demon to reveal its name. Does Sheela, then, place her unnamed abuser in
the  position  of  a demon—would  the  utterance  of  his  name  conjure  him  up?  This
explanation too falls short of capturing the kind of intensity with which Sheela described
her dread of this utterance. Sheela, after all, is not talking about someone else, a third
person, whether human or demon, but about herself, the first person—and one’s relation
to oneself is not based on observational knowledge. As Anscombe (1981) argued in her
classic essay on the first person, one does not use the word I to refer to oneself as one
would use other pronouns to refer to a second or third person. Although there might be
room for debate on Anscombe’s claim that the pronoun ‘I’ is non-referential under all
conditions, there is, indeed, little doubt whom I mean when I use the first person. The self
is not one object among others; I do not infer how I am feeling by observing myself. Yet in
Sheela’s experience, there is a name embedded in her body that destroys the intimacy she
has with herself. She cannot let go of this name without making the universe go topsy-




51 I  argued  that  juxtaposing  some  compelling  ethnographic  moments  with  literary
examples, helps us to think of the varied facets through which names course through life.
As in the other essays in this volume I have tried to show how the South Asian material
on names and naming can be brought to bear on theoretical  issues around the play
between singularity and multiplicity, contingency and necessity and the person as both
autonomous and an instrument of the will  of  the other.  Perhaps the most important
lesson I learnt from engagement with texts and lives is that the name can provide a
window into the way in which everyday life is imbued with the dark hues of violence,
betrayal, and the corrosion of relationships. And yet, names also hold the promise that we
can bet on the trust we place in others as one important way to redeem everyday life, as
the examples from the trust Rāma placed in Bharata show.
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NOTES
1. I thank the three anonymous reviewers of SAMAJ for their meticulous reading of an earlier
draft and critical comments that helped enormously in improving the argument. I am also very
grateful to those who commented on the paper when it was first presented at Madison in 2014
and to my fellow contributors, especially Jacob Copeman, for an exciting adventure with names.
2. Rāmacaritmānas is  the magnum opus of the poet Tulsidas and was composed in 1574.  It  is
regarded as a new telling of the inexhaustible Rāmakathā—the sacred story of Rāma. Tulsidas
himself  calls  the  language  of  the  composition—bhāshā—lit.  language,  i.e. a  broad  term  for
vernacular languages. Although some authors characterized the language of the Rāmacaritmānas
as Baisavari,  there is  a general consensus that its  language is  Avadhi of which Baisavari  is  a
dialect.  The  text  has  a  number  of  full  phrases  and  words  adapted  from different  languages
including Persian loan words (see Pandey 1976 and Stasik 2009)
3. Although there is an impressive literature on the relation between gifts and caste or affinal
status (Parry 1986; Raheja 1988), what I want to emphasize is the style of giving and refusing
gifts.
4. The reference is to the following verse in the Quran: ‘Fight those who do not believe in Allah,
nor in the latter day, nor do they prohibit what Allah and His Apostle have prohibited, nor follow
the religion of truth,  out  of  those  who have been given the Book,  until  they pay the tax in
acknowledgment of superiority and they are in a state of subjection’ [Quran 9:29].
5. This is the only text Guru Gobind Singh wrote in Persian. I have used phonetic spellings for the
Persian verses. Several translations in Hindi and Punjabi are available (see Sing 1967); and for an
interesting  discussion  on  discursive  contests  and  claiming of  spiritual  authority,  see  French
(2013).
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6. The various names of Draupadī might be grouped as tekonyms—Draupadī, Drupadkanyā, etc.
referring to her lineage; others are adjectival referring to several features such as her beautiful
smile—Mālinī, or her youth—Nitayuvanī. The names Krishnā—the dark one and Yajyasenī—born
of the sacrificial fire—have special importance because they point to the different layers in the
story.
7. Marcos Motta informs me that in Zanzibar the spirit who manifests itself in ritual might treat
the human body as the table!
8. I have used phonetic spellings for spoken Punjabi and Hindi.
9. See Das (2007) for the notion of rotation in Bergson’s discussion of time and how it allows a
certain region of the past to become present in the telling of a story.
ABSTRACTS
This paper argues for a theory of naming beyond the philosophical concerns with proper names
as  the test  case  for  theories  of  reference.  Moving forward from anthropological  concerns  of
naming practices as forms of convention, I argue that names in the Indian tradition participate in
a wider problematic  in which the name opens the person to the world as  it  also makes her
vulnerable to the world. Taking examples from my long time ethnographic engagement with
families in Delhi and juxtaposing these examples with iconic moments of naming in stories from
two Indian epics, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata (including their vernacular versions) the
paper shows that attention to how names are used alerts us to such existential  questions as
whether one remains the same person to oneself and to another over the course of a life time.
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